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THE MODERN PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATION:
A CRITIQUE AND A PROPOSAL
WITH the blossoming of the modern philanthropic foundation, the age of
bigness invaded the field of public charity. The foundation represents a new
technique available to individuals who wish to devote their surplus wealth
to public purposes. Unlike such traditional charitable institutions as hos-
pitals, churches and schools, which conduct activities directly beneficial
to the public,' philanthropic foundations confine most of their activities to
grants-in-aid to other charitable institutions or endeavors.
2
Foundations are generally endowed with securities or land; 3 and since
foundation disbursements are typically made out of income earned by this
wealth,4 endowments must be sizable if disbursements are to be effective."
Moreover, the majority of foundations receive their total endowments from
a single person, family, or business group0 They are typically the product
of large, private fortunes amassed in the United States during the past
century.7 While there were less than 10 foundations in the United
States in 1900,8 this number rose to approximately 35 in 1915,0 100 in
1. For a detailed history of traditional charitable endowments see Tuuus, TIM
MODERN PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATION AND PRIVATE PRoPERm' 3-28 (unpublished thesis
submitted in 1947 in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the graduate degree in law
at Yale Law School, and soon to be published by the Yale University Press). This work
was the most helpful of all source material used in the preparation of this comment and
will hereafter be cited as Tuxxs. For shorter historical sketches see HARnIsou AND)
ANDREWS, AmmcaNCA FOUNDATIONS FOR SOCIAL WVEIARE 11-18 (1946) (cited hereafter
as HARRISON AND ANDREWs); Hollis, Evolution of the Philanthropic Foundation, 20
EDUcATIONAL RECORD 575 (1939); Orton, Endowneists and Foundations in 5 EcYc.
Soc. SCL 531-3 (1931); Rosenwald, Philanthropy in 17 ENcYc. BrTANzncA 709 (1933);
Note, The Use of Charitable Foundations for Avoidance of Taxes, 34 y. L. Rsv. 182,
183 (1948).
2. HARRISON AND ANDRWs 39; TUNcs 34-5.
3. Tutors c. III. The average assets of 76 foundations as of 1940 consisted ap-
proximately 50 per cent of secured loans, 35 per cent of common stocks, 5 per cent of
preferred stocks and 10 per cent of real estate and other assets. Id. at 97. See also
HARRISON AND ANDREWS 57.
4. See notes 66 and 67 infra.
5. The return on foundation investments is currently very low. HAnrlson AND
ANDREWS 70. In 1946, a conservative estimate of foundation return on capital was placed
at 3 per cent. Id. at 57. The yield on all investments of the Carnegie Corporation for
1942 and 1943 was 2.7 per cent. Tuxxs 99.
6. Orton, supra note 1, at 533; TuNrs 35-6.
7. See HARRISON AND ANDREWS 19; TuNics 37, 56-62; Orton, supra note 1, at 533;
Gow, Foundations: Their Policies and Practices, Pittsburgh Record, July, 1933, p. 14
at 15-16; Note, The Use of Charitable Foundations for the Avoidance of Taxes, 34 VA. L.
REv. 182, 183 (1948).
8. HARRIsON AND ANDREWS 17-18; TuNrs 40; Orton, supra note 1, at 533; For-
tune, Aug., 1947, p. 108 at 109, col. 1.
9- TuNxs 38, 40.
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1930,10 162 in 1940,11 and 505 in 1944.12 The 1944 estimate, made by the
Russell Sage Foundation, was restricted to foundations with assets in excess
of $50,000; 13 and the total value of assets held by the 505 foundations was
estimated at $1,817,817,299.14 Of these assets, which represent the bulk of
all foundation assets in the country, approximately 87 per cent were held by
the 30 largest foundations.'0
Bigness has been accompanied by breadth of purpose. Foundations
typically refrain from direct relief of the needy; instead, they sponsor pro-
grams of study, experiment, correction, cure and prevention. 10 In this
10. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, AMERICAN FOUNDATIONS AND THEIR FIELDS 10
(1931) ; TuNxs 38, 41.
11. SEYEoLD, AmEuCAN FOUNDATIONS AND THEIR FiLms V 14 (1942).
12. HARRISON AND ANDREwS 7, 103-185.
13. Id. at 214.
Different criteria for inclusion of organizations as foundations bring about different
estimates. Thus, the Twentieth Century Fund estimate of 1948, including known founda-
tions with assets of less than $50,000, came to 899. RIcH AND DEARDORFF, AMEICAN
FOUNDATIONS AND THEut FmLS VI 11 (1948) (cited hereafter as RIcH AND DEAu-
DORFF). And Tunks' estimate, as of 1944, based on more stringent criteria than those of
the Russell Sage Foundation and the Twentieth Century Fund, included only 252 founda-
tions. TUN:s 46, 49. Tunks restricted his estimate to foundations making at least some
grants to outside beneficiaries other than local relief organizations, and whose endow-
ments were contributed by a small number of persons. See notes 2 and 6 supra and
note 16 infra; Tuxis 33-6. Furthermore, Tunks excluded foundations on which he
could not acquire detailed data for purposes of classification, id. at 47, while the Russell
Sage and Twentieth Century 'estimates included foundations about which relatively no
information -could be gathered. HARRISON AND ANDREWS 104-185; RIH AND DEAR-
Do , 244-65.
In contrast to Tunks' selective estimate, an unofficial, 1947 guess by the Treasury
Department, including known and unknown foundations, came to more than 10,000.
Fortune, Aug., 1947, p. 108 at 109, col. 1.
14. HARRISQN AND ANDREws 62. The total value of assets held by the 899 founda-
tions included in the Twentieth Century Fund estimate was only $1,539,966,000. Rc
AND DARDORFF 11. The Twentieth Century estimate for 899 foundations is almost
$300,000 below the Russell Sage estimate for only 505 because the Twentieth Century
Fund listed assets of only 240 foundations which reported their capital assets, ibid., while
the Russell Sage Foundation included almost $400,000,000 estimated assets of those
foundations not reporting their capital assets. HARRISON AND ANDREIws 57-8. The Rus-
sell Sage estimate included reported assets of only $1,431,553,417 as reported by 265
foundations. Ibid. The 252 foundations included in the Tunks estimate reported assets in
1944 of $1,543,006,000. TuNxs 49. And the latest estimate of the Sloan Foundation now
places total foundation assets at about $2,000,000,000. N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1949, p. 21,
Col. 1.
15. HARRISON AND ANDREWS 62.
16. The first foundation embodying this ideal was the Peabody Education Fund, es-
tablished in 1867 "for the promotion and encouragement of intellectual, moral, or indus-
trial education among the young of the more destitute portions of the Southern and
Southwestern States... " TuNRCs 23. See also HoLLs, PnILANTIIOPIC FOUNDATIONS
AND HIGHER EDUCATION 32 (1938) : "Peabody was the world's first philanthropist....
[U]p to this time philanthropy was palliative; now it seeks to lay hold on the age to
come."
The Peabody ideal did not spread effectively until 1896 when Andrew Carnegie be-
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manner, they act as constructive rather than palliative social forces. And
absence of restriction in the original grants enables them to achieve flex-
ibility in their choice of beneficiaries. 17 The Carnegie foundations, for
example, have supported projects by the Brooldngs Institute, the National
Research Council and the American Law Institute.B In such achievements
the foundation has its principal justification.
Public spirit, however, is not the only motive for creating foundations."
Donors may be primarily interested in building or conserving private for-
tunes, or preserving family control over finance or industry. Accumulation
and immobilization of wealth in privately controlled foundations will serve
these ends. Donors can give vast sums to these foundations without encoun-
tering the heavy tax burden which would otherwise accompany such trans-
fers, 20 and the foundations, once created, receive continuing tax benefits.
2 '
gan to establish his prototypes of the modem philanthropic foundation. TuNKS 28. The
Carnegie philosophy was to benefit the community by placing within its reach the ladders
upon which the aspiring could rise. CARN E, GosPEL OF sVEALTni 15 (Doubleday,
Doran & Co. ed. 1933); see also HAmusox AmD AwDaxws 21. And this philosophy has
become the touchstone of most modern foundations. Id. at 96-8; Ricir A D DFAMorrF
15-17. The Rockefeller Foundation, for example, adopted the following criteria in choos-
ing its beneficiaries: individual charity and relief were excluded; purely local applicants
were excluded except where they could serve as models; local cooperation was a requi-
site; preference was given to activities which went to the heart of individual or social
ill-being or misery; and projects were required to be welt thought out and definite before
presentation to the foundation. Sm. Doc. No. 415, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., v. 9 pp. 8139-41
(1916).
17. The majority of foundations have broad charters, see ELIorr AiD CxmIai s,
CHARTERs oF PHmANTmoPIms (1939), which permit sufficient flexibility of purpose to
enable them to change their programs of work to meet developing needs. HAunson AzD
AwDrmvs 38. The Rockefeller Foundation, for example, is organized "to promote the
well-being of mankind throughout the world." Ibid. And among the foundation's criteria
in choice of beneficiaries are the following: permanent obligations should not be as-
sumed by the foundation; gifts in perpetuity should be avoided. SEi. Doc. No. 415,
supra note 16, at v. 9 p. 8140.
18. Tuxics 30.
19. Donors may be driven by a desire to spite legal heirs, see Tu.nxs 144-5; pre-
serve their names or Memories, id. at 146-7; win public approval, see KuPEL, TnE
FoUNDATioxN 18 (1930) ; Tuxxs 147; or atone for former misdeeds, see Smzu. Doe. No.
415, supra note 16, at v. 1 p. 269 (recommendation by the Walsh Commission on Indus-
trial Relations that the Rockefeller Foundation be terminated and its funds spent to
relieve unemployment, sickness, and accident in labor's ranks, on the theory that the
foundation's funds consisted of wages American workers should have received: "These
wages were withheld by means of economic pressure, violation of law, cunning, violence
practiced over a series of years by the founder and.., his business associates.");
LnmzA, kVEALTH AxD CuLTURS 5 (1936).
20. "The provision [of the estate tax statute] ... enables decedents to perpetuate,
through charitable trusts and corporations, family control over their wealth without
paying the estate tax." Hearings before Committee on Ways and Mcans on Revenue Re-
rspson of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. v. 1 p. 92 (1942) (statement of Randolph Paul, Gen-
eral Counsel of the Treasury); and see 1 PAUL, FEDERAL EsAm, AD Gwr TAxAxioN
646 n. 3 (1942). See also pp. 487-9 and notes 148 and 149 infra.
21. IxTr. REv. CoDn §§ 101(6), 162(a). See pp. 489-91 and notes 112 and 121-3 infra.-
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Courts and legislatures, however, have made little effort to thwart un-
charitable purposes of founders. Neither have they considered the effect
of foundations on concentration of wealth and economic power2 2 The
philanthropic foundation today remains relatively unregulated.
FREEDOM OF FOUNDATIONS
Creation and Existence
Foundations can be easily created and easily insulated against attacks
on their legal existence. They may be created as trusts; 28 they may also be
incorporated under state statutes or special state or federal charters2 4
While some state constitutions prohibit the granting of special charters, 
2
incorporation under general non-pr'ofit corporation statutes is permitted in
all states.2 1 Charitable trusts, on the other hand, at one time were not
recognized in Virginia, West Virginia and Maryland,2 7 and even now Vir-
ginia gives only limited recognition.2 8 Their validity was questionable in
New York, Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota 29 until those states passed
22. See pp. 489, 490 and 497-500 and notes 158-62 infra.
Foundations have been subjected to several attacks on these grounds. The most
notable of these attacks can be found in LINDEMAN, WEALTH AND CULTURE (1936) and
in the testimony of Louis D. Brandeis, SEN. Doc. No. 415, supra note 16, at v. 8 pp. 7663-4,
and Samuel Gompers, Id. at v. 8 p. 7647, before the Walsh Commission on Industrial
Relations in 1916. For counter-attacks see the testimony of Samuel Untermeyer before
the Walsh Commission, Id. at v. 8 p. 7430-31; HARRISON AND ANDREWS 23; Furst,
Philanthropic Endownents in 17 ENcYc. BRITANNICA 712-13 (1938).
23. See, generally, 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS §§ 348, 348.2 and 348.3 (1939).
24. See, generally, BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 7 (1946) ; 3 ScoTr, TRUsTs § 348.1.
25. E.g., MIcH. CONsT. Art. XII, § 1.
26. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 32, §§ 163a-163alO0 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1948). The
only state which has an enabling act especially for foundations is Michigan. MxcIt.
STAT. ANN. § 21.164 (Henderson, 1935).
27. E.g., Trinity M. E. Church v. Baker, 91 Md. 539, 46 Atl, 1020 (1900) ; Fifield v.
Van Wyck's Ex'r, 94 Va. 557, 27 S.E. 446 (1897) ; Bible Society v. Pendleton, 7 W.Va.
79 (1873). The situation in these states resulted from repudiation of the British Statute
of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 ELiz. c. 4, and the erroneous conclusion by the courts of
these states that the Statute of Charitable Uses established the charitable trust. 3 ScoTT,
TRusTs 1927; TUNKS 182; Blackwell, The Charitable Corporation and the Charilable
Trust, 24 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 7-13 (1938). The charitable trust, in reality, antedated the
Statute of Charitable Uses, which was nothing more than an expression of existing com-
mon law doctrine permitting the establishment of charitable trusts. 3 ScOrr, TRUSTS
§ 348.2; TuNxcs 4-10, 182.
28. VA. CODE §§ 55-26, 55-27 (1950) (limited to trusts for educational uses). Moore
v. Perkins, 169 Va. 175, 192 S.E. 806 (1937). West Virginia and Maryland have given
belated recognition. W. VA. CODE §§ 3501, 3502 (Michie, 1949) (did not become effective
until 1931, Beatty v. Union Trust and Deposit Co., 123 W. Va. 144, 148, 13 S.E.2d 760,
762 (1941). MD. ANN. CODE Art. 16, § 279 (Flack, 1939) (became effective in 1931,
Md. Laws 1931, c. 453).
29. E.g., Wheelock v. American Tract Society, 109 Mich. 141, 66 N.W, 955 (1896);
Watkins v. Bigelow, 93 Minn. 210, 100 N.W. 1104 (1904); Ruth v. Oberbrunner, 40
Wis. 238 (1876). The uncertain status of charitable trusts in those states resulted from
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remedial legislation.3o The majority of foundations are therefore incor-
porated.
31
Technically, creation of a foundation is simple. While creation of a trust
by will necessitates compliance with all formal requirements for wills,32 an
inter vivos trust may be created by conveyance, deed or declaration of
trust.33 Even when a will sets forth charitable purposes inexpertly, equity
will occasionally repair it. 34 Establishment of testamentary trusts is further
facilitated by refusal of courts to let a trust fail for want of a trusteeA5
Corporations, in turn, can be organized under general state statutes by
filing articles of incorporation with the secretary of state, ' a procedure which
is now a formalitvy.
Existence of a foundation, once created, may be attacked directly by the
state,3 s or collaterally by disinherited heirs, taxing authorities or tort claim-
ants.39 A corporation need only file under the proper statute, albeit de-
the omission in trust legislation during the nineteenth century of provisions for charitable
trusts before the growth of foundations. See note 7 supra; TuNKs 184-6; Blackwell,
supra note 27, at 13.
30. N.Y. PEns. PROP. LAW § 12; N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 113. These provisions were
passed in 1893 as the Tilden Act, N.Y. Laws 1893, c. 701, Blackwell, supra note 27, at 14,
after invalidation of the $5,000,000 Tilden trust in 1891. Tilden v. Green, 130 N.Y. 29, 28
N.E. 880 (1891) (in absence of statute validating charitable trusts, Tilden trust failed
for want of a definite beneficiary, whereas charitable trusts, when recognized, do not re-
quire definite beneficiaries). The Tilden Act validated charitable trusts for uncertain
beneficiaries, but did not permit perpetual charitable trusts. Blackwell, smpra note 27, at
15. Michigan's statute, passed in 1907, Mich. Acts 1907, No. 122, is a replica of the
Tilden Act, save for a provision authorizing perpetual charitable trusts. Micro STAT.
Ax.N. § 26.1191 (Henderson, 1935). Wisconsin and Minnesota also passed imitations of
the Tilden Act in 1917, Wis. Laws 1917, c. 170, and 1927, Minn. Laws 1927, c. 180, re-
spectively. The Wisconsin law contains no authorization for perpetual trusts, VIs. STAT.
§ 231.11 (1947), while the Minnesota law does. MiNx. STAT. Asx. § 501.12 (1945).
31. Of 183 foundations investigated as of 1944, 121 were incorporated (92 under
general statute and 29 under special legislative charter) while only 62 were established
as trusts. TuNEs 181. Charitable trusts are noticeably scarce in Virginia, West Vir-
ginia, Maryland, New York, Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota. Of the 62 trusts in-
vestigated as of 1944, none was established in Virginia, West Virginia or Maryland, id.
at 183; only 4 were established under New York law as perpetual trusts, thereby risking
invalidation (see note 30 supra), TuNIs 185; 5 were established in Michigan after 1907
(see note 30 supra), TUNEs 186; and none vas established in Wisconsin or Minnesota.
Ibid.
32. 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS §357; RzmsN, POST MoRTEM UsE oF ,VMATU 3-85 (1911).
33. 3 ScoT, TRUSTS § 349.
34. See TuNEs 201.
35. 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS §397; TuNEs 201; e.g., Jeffreys v. International Trust Co, 97
Colo. 188, 48 P.2d 1019 (1935).
36. E.g., ILi. ANN. STAT. c. 32 §§ 163a27-163a30 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1948). See
TuNEs 187.
37. See Tuux:s 187.
38. See, generally, BALLANTNE, CoaroaRAoNs § 23 (1946).
39. See TuNES 187.
These three classes are the only ones likely to contest the existence of a charitable
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fectively, to render itself immune from collateral attack.40 It is open to
direct attack for defects in filing; 41 but such defects may be cured by amend-
ing the articles of incorporation. 42 A trust can be attacked with success,
directly or collaterally, when the declaration of trust fails to specify "char-
itable" beneficiaries. 43 Moreover, if such failure occurs, the declaration
cannot be amended; 41 and establishment of a new trust may be impossible
or unavailing.
Direct attacks, however, almost never occur." And careful draftsman-
ship can immunize all foundations from any attack, since courts look not to
the intent of the donor nor to the accomplishments of his foundation, but
only to the formal purposes stated in the document creating the founda-
corporation: disinherited heirs, because they take by intestate succession if there is no
corporation to take under a will; taxing authorities, because they can not tax a charity
or transfers to a charity, see pp. 486-91 and notes 73-6 infra; and tort claimants, be-
cause charities are usually immune from tort liability. BALLANTINE, CORPOaxTONs 28
(1946).
40. When a corporation is thus immunized from collateral attack it is said to have
de facto existence. Essentials for recognition of de facto corporate existence are four:
(1) A valid statute under which the corporation in question could have been formed,
(2) Colorable compliance with that statute.
(3) Transaction of business in some way as if the corporation in question was a
corporation.
(4) Good faith in claiming to be a corporation, and fairness between the parties
under the circumstances.
BAL.ANTipN, CoiwoRAazoNs § 24 (1946). See also TuNKs 187. Recent state enabling
acts provide specifically for de facto existence. E.g., ILL. STATs. ANN. c. 32 § 163a30
(Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1948).
41. Against direct attack, the corporation must show de lure existence. And sub-
stantial compliance with the mandatory provisions of the incorporation statute is re-
quired to show de jure existence. BALLANTINE, CORPORAnoxs 76 (1946). See also
TuNKs 187-8.
42. E.g., ILrL STAT. ANN. c. 32 §§ 163a32-163a36 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1948); see
TuNKs 190. See also note 52 infra.
43. E.g., Chichester Diocesan Fund v. Simpson [1944] A.C. 341 (testamentary trust
for charitable institutions or "other charitable or benevolent . . .objects" as trustee may
select, held invalid). In the Chichester case, the House of Lords found, first, that the
testator intended to permit the trustee to spend trust funds on purposes which were not
"charitable" if he so chose; and, second, that such a trust was invalid as a perpetual
trust since it was not exclusively "charitable". See notes 59-61 and 63 infra. The pit-
fall in the Chichester case was the use of the word "benevolent", a word traditionally
frowned upon by courts as not coming within the classic "charitable" fields of poverty,
health, education and religion. Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. 399 (Ch. 1804), 10
Ves. 522 (Ch. 1805) ("such objects of benevolence and liberality," held not "charitable").
The doctrine of the Morice case has been generally adopted in America. E.g., Read
v. McLean, 240 Ala. 501, 200 So. 109 (1941); see Scott, Trusts for Charitable and
Benevolent Purposes, 58 HARv. L. REv. 548, 551 n. 10 (1945). Contra: Goodale v,
Mooney, 60 N.H. 528 (1881).
44. See TuNKs 190.
45. TUTNKS 188; see notes 55-8 infra.
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tion.4 If the purposes stated in the articles of incorporation fulfill the broad
requirements of the incorporating statute, or if those in the trust indenture
state a "charitable" end, the foundation's existence is invulnerable to attack.
Operation
After its establishment, the foundation is subject to little public control.
Although trustees may be personally liable to the trust or its beneficiaries
for failure to invest trust funds "prudently" or in legislatively "approved"
investments,47 such liability may have been ruled out by the settlor.43 Cor-
porate directors are generally immune from personal liability in the ab-
sence of bad faith.49
Proceedings for specific performance, rescission or reformation afford,
in theory, greater opportunities for public control. They may be instituted
46. See 2 BOGExr, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 364 (1935) ; 3 ScoTt, Tnusrs 1974 and
1974 n. 4; TuxCKs 155-6, 190; see Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How. 126, 197-8 (U.S.
1844) ; Matter of Frasch, 245 N.Y. 174, 182, 156 N.E. 656, 658 (1927). See also note
83 infra.
47. 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS §227. Many states provide lists of "approved" investments;
some lists are extremely conservative. Id., § 227.13. Some statutes prohibit deviation
from the list without specific authority from the court or settlor. E.g., FLA. STAT. AN.
§518.01 (1943) ("may invest... only in the following:"); LA. GsN. STAT. §9850.62
(Dart, 1939) ("shall invest ... only in the following. .. *"). Some are permissive.
E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 58 § 47 (1940) ("may, . .. in addition to any other investments now
permitted by law, invest... 2'); ARm STAT. AN. c. 58-103 (1947) ("It shall be law-
ful ... to invest... "'). See, generally, 2 ScoTi, TRUsTs § 227.13; Comment, Legal
Lists in Trust Investment, 49 YA~T L.J. 891, 896-9 (1940). Investments permitted by
such statutes must be "prudently" selected in most states even though they fall within
an "approved" class. 2 ScoTr, TRUSTS §§227.12, 227.13; RzsTATEmS-E T, TRUSTS §227,
comments in and p (1935) ; Legis., 49 HAnv. L. REv. 821, 823 (1936) ; e.g., Campbell v.
Albers, 313 Ill. App. 152, 165-6, 39 N.E.2d 672, 679 (1942). And, of course, invest-
ments not specifically enumerated in permissive statutes and investments in states which
do not have "approved" lists must pass the judicial test of prudence. See, generally, 2
ScoTr, TRUSTS § 227. For judicial criteria of prudence, see, generally, 2 Scorr, TnusTs
§§227.1-227.11. Some states, moreover, have established the "prudent man" formula by
legislation. E.g., CAi. Crv. Coan § 2261 (Deering, 1949).
48. See, for example, note 132 infra. Legislation limiting trust investments always
leaves room for provisions by the settlor absolving trustees from liability for failure to
invest in legislatively approved investments. E.g., LA. GEN. STAT. §9850.62 (Dart,
1939); CAr_ Cim. CODE §2261 (Deering, 1949). See, generally, RESTATzimiT, TausTs
§227 (1935); 2 Scorr, TRUSTS 1226; Tuxns 197-S.
49. Restrictions upon corporate directors flow from corporate statutes rather than
trust doctrine and therefore are rarely stringent. Tuxcrs 193. But some states have
subjected charitable corporations to the same lists of "approved" investments to which
they have subjected trusts with personal liability imposed upon directors for losses re-
sulting from deviation from such lists. E.g., ORE. Coxp'. LAws ANN. § 73-103 (1940).
Bad faith is a ground for liability on the part of trustees as well as directors. And
the settlor of a trust cannot rule out such liability, since an attempt to do so would be
against public policy. RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS § 222, comment b (1935) ; 2 ScoTT, Tnusrs
§ 222.3; e.g., Carrier v. Carrier, 226 N.Y. 114, 125-7, 123 N.F_ 135, 138-9 (1919).
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to compel contribution by the foundation to its beneficiaries; 61 to remove
trustees or corporate directors for abuse of discretion; 11 or to reform trust
indentures when fulfilment of their terms has become impossible or im-
practicable. 52 But in practice these remedies are rarely invoked. Since
beneficiaries of most foundations are indefinite,53 suits to compel con-
tribution or to remove trustees or directors must usually be brought by state
attorneys-general. 4 Attorneys-general are usually uninformed " and un-
50. 3 Scorr, TRUSTS §§ 391, 392.
51. 3 ScorT, TRUSTS § 387; TUNIS 201 and 357 n. 96.
52. Such reformation is granted by the courts under the doctrine of cy pres. Con-
siderable emergency must be shown to warrant application of the doctrine, i.e., that the
trust funds are insufficient to accomplish the stated object; that the funds are excessive
for accomplishing the object; or that changing events have made accomplishment of the
object impossible. 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 438 (1935). Application of the
doctrine is further restricted by the requirement that if The stated charitable intent fails,
a general charitable intent must be found in the trust to warrant modification of the in-
strument to fulfill unstated charitable purposes. Id., § 436. A final limitation of the doc-
trine is that it is not in force in approximately 7 jurisdictions. Id. at 1297-8. See, gen-
erally, TuNxs 243-5; 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 399-399.4.
Charters of charitable corporations, however, are never amended in court. Statutes
usually provide for their amendment, when necessary, by corporate directors. See note
42 supra.
53. See 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 364, 375. See also note 17 supra.
54. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 391, comment a (1935); 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS 1967; Note,
State Supervision of the Administration of Charitable Trusts, 47 COL. L. REv. 659, 661
(1947). Attorneys-general are empowered to sue on the theory that they represent whole
classes of indefinite beneficiaries. 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 1259 (1935) ; Note,
State Supervision of the Administration of Charitable Trusts, 47 COL. L. R.v. 659, 661
(1947). Would-be beneficiaries, because they are indefinite, are unqualified to sue the
trustees. E.g., Averill v. Lewis, 106 Conn. 582, 138 Atd. 815 (1927) (where trust was to
provide home for white Protestant female teachers of a certain county, 110 such teachers
who were possible beneficiaries of the trust had no status to appeal from an accounting
decree establishing the corpus of the trust; only the Attorney-General could appeal).
Such restrictions on suits by would-be beneficiaries is the result of a desire to save trus-
tees from frequent, vexatious suits based on inadequate investigation, and brought by
irresponsible parties. 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 1259 (1935).
55. The most common form of statute providing for availability of trust information
to attorneys-general requires all trustees (private and charitable) to file periodic ac-
counts after the settler's death, usually with a probate court, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 7052 (1949); OHIO CODE ANN. § 10506-34 (Page, 1937); or equity court, e.g., DEL.
REv. CODE, § 4400 (1935). These statutes do not require accountings by inter vivos
trustees. A few states provide specifically for accounting by all charitable trustees. E.g.,
IND. STAT. ANN. § 7-714 (Burns, 1933); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36-19 (1943). And only a
few others require charitable corporations to report annually to the secretary of state.
E.g., MxcH. STAT. ANN. § 21.81 (Henderson, 1935); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 32 § 163a63
(Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1948). Where requirements of reports do exist they request little
information. See, for example, the Illinois statute on corporate reports which is the
most recent and the most detailed. ILT. ANN. STAT. c. 32 §§ 163a63 and 163a98. And see
TUNxs 297-8.
Moreover, in no state are foundations required to report directly to the attorney-
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derstaffed. 5 As a result they bring few such suits.n Nor do they often sue
to reform trust agreements. 53 The freedom of charitable foundations to
operate as they please is virtually complete.
Duration
The most important freedom extended to founders is the power to make
their "monuments" permanent. The Rule against Perpetuities, adopted by
all states,59 requires that transferred interests vest absolutely in some person
within a stated period of time, usually measured by a life or lives in being
and 21 years.fi The ordinary trust must be terminable within the period re-
quired by the rule.61 Because of the supposed desirability of providing se-
curity for charitable beneficiaries,6 2 however, charitable trusts can be set
up to last forever." Transfers to charitable corporations escape the Rule
general; thus, foundation failure to file a report may easily escape his notice. See
Bushnell, Report and Recommendations for Legislation, MAss. L.Q., May, 1945, p. 22,
at 24, 28; Note, State Supervision of the Administration of Charitable Trusts, 47 CoL. L
Rav. 659, 663 (1947) ; D'Amours, Control of Charitable Trusts, Regular Superision by
Attorney General Urged, Journal of Capital Trusts and Estates, March 1947, p. 345.
56. See STATlENT Or CIO AND TWUA mEFORE II. Comm. ON Cni-AmAlli TRusTS
11 (1949). Bushnell, Report and Recommendation for Legislation, MAss. LQ., May,
1945, pp. 22, 26-7 (1945); Note, State Supervision of the Administration of Charitable
Trusts, 47 CoL L. REv. 659, 663 (1947) ; see Souhegan Nat. Bank v. Kenison, 92 N.H.
117, 122, 26 A2d 26, 30 (1942) : "But the [attorney-general's] office is unorganized and
unequipped to enforce such trusts in a comprehensive scheme under supervisory arrange-
ment. The result is that the office acts only in sporadic instances... ,
57. CIO AND TWUA STATEMENT BEFORE R.I. SpEc. Comm. ON CXnAiTABLE TnusTs
11 (1949). See also Bushnell, Report and Recommendation for Legislation, kLiss. LQ.,
May, 1945, p. 22 at 27 (1945) ; Note, State Supervison of the Administration of Charitable
Trusts, 47 CoL. L. Rav. 659, 662-3 (1947).
58. See note 57 supra. Admittedly, trustees themselves may demand reformation of
trusts, 2 Boar, TRUSTS AN TRUSTEES 1331 n. 8 (1935), but the necessity for regula-
tion arises precisely because many trustees fail to institute reformation proceedings.
59. Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 Htuv. L. REv. 638, 639 (1938). The rule
in approximately two-thirds of the states is a common law rule. In the remaining states
the common law rule has been modified to varying extents by statute. Ibid. For an
analysis of state legislation see 2 SiMEs, FuTURE INTERESTS C. 32 (1936).
60. Standard statements of the rule may be found in GRA, Tnz Ruizx AoGAsr
PzRErums 191 (4th ed. 1942) ; 2 Srms, FtrruRE INTERESTS § 490 (1936).
61. See 1 BOGaRT, TRusTS AND TRUSTEES 639 (1935); 2 Snxts, FUTURE INTEnEsrs
§553 (1936).
62. See 2 Sm-.s, FUTURE IxTrEEsTs § 554 (1936); Zo 2IN, AmEacAn LAW OF
CNHArriEs § 530 (1924); see In re Browning's Estate, 165 Misc. 819, 827-9, 1 N.Y.S. 2d
825, 832-3 (Surr. Ct., 1938), aff'd, 281 N.Y. 577, 22 N.E. 2d 160 (1939).
The opposite viewpoint is expressed in Rosenwald, Principles of Public Giving, 143
ATi. MONTHLY 599 (1929) (classic argument against perpetual foundations by founder
of Julius Rosenwald Fund, a foundation which was self-liquidating within 25 years), and
in Anthony, Should Endowments Be Perpetual? in TRusTs AND TnusTErsmnw 96
(Anthony ed., 1932). See also notes 166-8 infra.
63. 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS §365; 2 Srm:s, FtREu INTERE s §554 (1936); Zou"W. ,
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against Perpetuities by grace of a legal fiction. The corporation is in law a
"person," infinite though its life may be, and since interests transferred
vest absolutely in the corporation, the rule is satisfied.
An additional boon to perpetual existence of charitable trusts comes from
the ability of donors to prevent transferees from distributing the principal.
Restrictions of this kind cannot be put on transfers for private purposes:
direct "restraints on alienation" are forbidden. 4 But again, because of the
supposed desirability of encouraging charitable transfers, the general rule
has not been applied to restraints upon transferees for charitable purposes.06
Founders usually take advantage of this exception: the majority of founda-
tions are now prohibited by their founders from spending any of their
principal funds."6 And even where founders have permitted expenditures
of principal, trustees and directors often refrain from such action anyway.c7
The overwhelming majority of American foundations tend toward immor-
tality.
TAX PRIVILEGES FOR CHARITY
Over and above their comparative freedom from public regulation,
philanthropic foundations and their founders have enjoyed freedom from
federal and state taxation. This kindliness is justified primarily on the
ground that foundations fill a public need which the government would
otherwise be obligated to fill,68 and that this public need is better served by
op. cit. supra note 62, § 530; e.g., Camp v. Crocker's Adm., 54 Conn. 21, 5 At. 604
(1886).
64. 2 SImss, FuTuRE IN 'rznsTs, §§ 441-4 (1936). Like the Rule against Perpetiltics,
the rule against direct restraints upon alienation is a common law rule modified to vary-
ing degrees in a few states. Id., c. 32.
65. E.g., Trustees of First Presbyterian Church v. Wheeler, 149 Atl. 589 (N.J. Ci.
1930) (devise of land to church with provision that land not be sold except in future
emergency, held valid). See TUNEs 227-8; 40 YALE L.J. 143 (1930).
66. Of 124 foundations investigated as of 1944, 72 with assets of $616,489,000 (42
corporations and 30 trusts) were legally forbidden to spend principal, while 52 with
-assets of $478,974 (32 corporations and 20 trusts) were permitted by their founders to
spend principal. TuNKs 230. See also Note, The Use of Charitable Foundations for
Avoidance of Taxes, 34 VA. L. REv. 182, 198 (1948).
67. Of the 52 foundations investigated in 1944 which were permitted by their
founders to spend principal, see note 66 supra, 13 corporations with assets of $81,897,000
and 7 trusts with assets of $76,433,000 appeared never to have spent any of their princi-
pal funds; eleven corporations with assets of $242,967,000 and 7 trusts with assets of
$24,833,000 appeared to have spent principal; and information could not be confirmed as
to whether 14, with assets of about $50,000,000, had or had not spent principal. TuNgs
231-2.
68. "The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable and
other purposes is based upon.the theory that the Government is compensated for the loss
of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by
appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of
the general welfare." H. R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. v. 1 p. 742 (1939-1
Cum. BULL, Part 2, 742). See also 1 PAuL, FEERA. ESTATE AND GIrn TAxATioN § 12.04
(1940) ; TUNKS.286-7; Bradway, New Uses for Wealth as Endowmuents, 151 ANNALSs
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private foundations than by government.E Two classes of tax immunity
are embraced in this field: one for the founder and one for the foundation.
Founders, as donors of charity, can claim statutory deductions from estate,
inheritance, gift, and income taxes, while foundations are granted statutory
immunity from virtually all income and property taxes.
Founder Deductions
Federal estate and gift taxes, as well as state inheritance taxesn are
graduated progressively, with very high rates on transfers of large sums of
wealth.7'1 The dual purpose of this scheme is to base the tax on ability to
pay, and to prevent complete transfer of great concentrations of wealth
184 (1930); Lynch, The "Charities" Provisions of the Internal Rvenet1e Code, 10 FoRM.
L. Rv. 234, 250 (1941).
69. See Euor, ExEmrxo FO1 TAXATION IN MASSAcHu=Srs 21-45 (1910);
Shoup, Tax Exemption in 14 ENcYc. Soc. Sc. 528, 530 (1934); Schultz, Death Tax
Exemptions in TAx ExEmPTONS 107, 118 (Tax Policy League, 1939); Killough, EX-
emptions to Education, Philanthropic and Religious Organizations in id. at 23-33; Martin,
General Tleory of Tax Exemptions in id. at 3, 17; N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1949, p. 21, col. 1
(statement by Sloan Foundation) ; see In re Brovning's Estate, 165 Misc. 819, 829, 1
N.Y.S2d 825, 833 (Surr. Ct., 1938), aff'd, 281 N.Y. 577, 22 N.E2d 160 (1939) ("The
salvage of the American ideal will be difficult if the principle of subsidy overshadows the
principle of private charity. There is reason now to approve charitable foundations as
serving the public good because they restore to better balance the relationship of the in-
dividual to his government. To the extent of its resources, private charity will remove
the temptation of the underprivileged to regard government as obliged to furnish support
and will aid in the restoration of a sense of personal responsibility among its donees.
Such private funds are not subject to bureaucratic administration. They never lose their
character as true charity.").
The opposing viewpoint is expressed in WEGwoOD, Tim Ecozomics OF INTHEnITMcE
91 (1929) : "[I]t has been obvious, at least since the days of the Tudors, that, from the
fiscal point of view, taxation is a more satisfactory expedient than exhortations to private
benificence. It is also certain that it is likely to be a more efficient method of reducing
inequality than the encouragement of philanthropic bequests!' See also Knapp, Tax
Exemplions, address reported in PaoC xINGS OF NATioNAL TAX AssocrATior 74 (1934).
70. Since the Federal government allows a credit up to 80 per cent of the basic
federal estate tax for inheritance, legacy, succession, or estate taxes imposed by the
states and the District of Columbia, Ir. REv. CODE §813(b), 47 states and the District
of Columbia now impose inheritance taxes sufficient to take advantage of the 80 per cent
credit The state statutes are collected in TAx SYstEms 238-46 (1948). See Tuz-ns
252-3.
71. Ix r. REv. CODE §§ 810, 860 (basic estate tax rates); for state tax rates see TAX
SysTE:ms 238-46 (1948). The additional estate taxes of 1932 and 1949 illustrate the






Revenue Act of 1932, § 401, 47 STAT. 243 (1932) ; I T. REv. CoDz § 935.
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from one generation to the next.72 But since charitable gifts, no matter
what their size, inure in theory to the benefit of charity, testamentary gifts
to foundations are deductible by executors and administrators in computing
net taxable estates under the federal estate tax 13 and state inheritance tax
laws.7 4 Similarly inter vivos gifts to foundations are not subject to the
federal gift tax on inter vivos transfers.7
5
The tax savings available to founders extend beyond the estate and gift
tax deductions. In computing their net income for federal and state income
taxes, founders may deduct charitable gifts up to 15 per cent of their gross
income.78 Here again, while net income taxes are graduated progressively, 7
the deduction is allowed no matter how large the donor's income may be,
since the gift in theory goes to charity.
Thus, when foundations are created by testamentary or inter vivos gifts,
or by annual contributions by the founder out of income, or by both, the
government is a major contributor. Gifts to foundations are usually large 71
and they come from donors in high income tax brackets.79 Much of the funds
72. "But revenue alone is not the sole reason for the enactment of the Federal death
duty. There have been in this country for many years warm adherents to the belief that
something must be done to discourage rapid growing fortunes, that some limit must be
placed upon the possibility of a few individuals acquiring so much money that the Gov-
ernment itself is menaced by the power it brings them." Roper, Taxation Problems-
II Who Should Pay the Taxes?, 222 N. Am. REv. 12, 13 (1925). See also H.R. REP. No.
1681, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1939-1 Cum. BuLL., Part 2, 643) (message of President
Roosevelt to Congress, June 19, 1935) ; Hearings before the Senate Finance Committee
on H.R. 8974 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 177-8 (1935) (testimony of Robert H. Jackson, Ass't.
Gen. Counsel, Treas. Dept. (now Mr. Justice Jackson)). For a thorough discussion of
the problem and numerous citations see 1 PAuL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFr TAXATION
§§ 1.02, 1.07 (1942).
73. INT. REv. CODE § 812(d).
74. E.g., COLO. STAT. c. 85 §26(c) (1935). Some states exempt charitable trans-
fers from their inheritance tax instead of allowing a deduction for such transfers. E.g.,
IND. STAT. ANN. § 6-2403 (Burns, 1933).
75. INTr. REV. CODE § 1004(a) (2) (B).
76. INT. REv. CODE § 23(o) (individual deductions up to 15 per cent). Corporations
are legally permitted to establish foundations but have never done so. They frequently
contribute to foundations out of income, however, and are allowed only a 5 per cent de-
duction for such contributions. INT. Rxv. CODE § 23(q).
Of the 35 states and the District of Columbia which have personal or corporate in-
come taxes, only two, Idaho and Montana, do not allow deductions for charitable con-
tributions. TUNxs 263 and 369 n. 16. Twelve states impose a limit on individual deduc-
tions smaller than the 15 per cent limit found in Section 23(o) of the Internal Revenue
Code. TuNxs 369 n. 16; e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-147 (Michie, 1943) (10 per cent
limit). And 10 states allow a larger limit on corporate deductions than the 5 per cent limit
found in Section 23(q) of the Code. TAx SYSTEMS 137-8 (1948) ; e.g., N.D. Con § 57-
3822 (1943) (15 per cent limit). All the state statutes are collected in TAX SYsTEMs
128-34 (1948).
77. E.g., INT. REv. CODE §12(b). See also notes 71 and 72 supra.
78. See notes 5 and 7 supra.
79. See notes 5-7 stupra.
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which go to foundations tax-free would ordinarily be collected by the govern-
ment in taxes.S°
Presumably these deductions should be available only if the gift is for a
public purpose. Despite ample evidence, however, that foundations which
receive transfers often are used by their founders to build or conserve private
fortunes, or to preserve family control over finance or industry,"' these
factors have never been used as a basis for denying the estate, gift or in-
come tax deduction.82 The Treasury has failed to explore the possibilities
of such an attack, perhaps because courts have indicated that they would
refuse to investigate the actual achievements of foundations. As long as
foundation principal or income is not payable or paid to private beneficiaries,
words of "charitable intent" in a foundation instrument appear to be enough
to render contributions to such a foundation deductible."
Foundation Immunity
State and municipal property taxes impose some burdens on charitable
institutions. For example, in order to protect the revenues of towns and
cities where private schools and churches own most of the land, several
states provide for taxation of realty held by charities for investment pur-
poses. 4 Foundation investments, however, are usually in personal rather
than real property,8 5 and personalty is almost always exempt.,
But the most important tax benefit enjoyed by foundations is the im-
munity from the federal income tax provided in Sections 101(6) and 162(a)
of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 101(6) exempts from taxation all
corporations, funds or foundations "organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals." The Treasury originally
sought an interpretation of this section which would have disqualified in-
stitutions engaging in any business activities. But the Supreme Court re-
80. See GRISWOLD, CASES ON FEDERAL TA.xATIoN 26 (2d ed. 1946); Moz.-rucom
AND WYNN, FEDERAL TAXES-EsTATES, TRuSTS AND GrFTs 28-31 (1948-9); 1 PAUL,
FEDERAL ESTATE AND Grr TAXATIO § 1228 (1942); TuNrcs 260-62.
81. See pp. 497-501 and notes 142-54, 158-62 infra.
82. See TUNKs 264.
83. In A. W. Mellon, 36 B.T.A. 977, 1048, 1064-6 (1937), the A. NV. Mellon Educa-
tional and Charitable Trust was held a proper recipient of income tax-deductible gifts,
though rare paintings supposedly donated to it remained in possession of the Mellon
family. The court looked only to the charitable intent as stated in the foundation instru-
ment See Tuxcxs 264 and 342 n. 28; N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1937, p. 1, col. 1. And the
Mellon Trust also received free of the estate tax a substantial estate, estimated at about
$100,000,000, from A. Xv. Mellon at his death. See GRIsw0vo, CASES On FEEaRA!. TAX-
ATIOx 286 (2d ed. 1946). See also notes 46 supra and 89 infra.
84. E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. c. 120 § 500 (Smith-Hurd, 1936); N.Y. TAX LAw § 4
(1948).
85. See note 3 supra.
86. See TuN-s 283; e.g., N.Y. TAx LAW § 3 (1948).
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fused to accept the Treasury's view. An institution is operated for a charita-
ble purpose as long as the "ultimate destination" of the entire business in-
come is a charitable cause.87
The trust form of institution picks up an additional tax privilege in Sec-
tion 162(a). Though the trust engages in non-charitable pursuits, it may
deduct from taxable gross income any part of its income spent or set aside
permanently for charitable purposes pursuant to the terms of the trust
instrument. Should it so dispose of all of its income, the trust gains complete
exemption under either 162(a) or 101(6).
It would seem, moreover, that the 101(6) exemption for all forms of so-
called "charitable" foundations is available even though the main motive
of the founder was private 'rather than public. The Treasury has never
attempted to challenge a 101(6) exemption with the argument that the
foundation was being used primarily to preserve a private fortune, and if
made the attempt would probably fail. Courts are likely to follow their past
procedure 81 and refuse to investigate the actual accomplishments of the
foundation. Wherever they find provisions of general charitable intent
precluding payment of principal or income to private beneficiaries, courts
may quickly conclude that the foundation was "organized . . .exclusively
for . . . [a] charitable . . . purpose .... ,, 81
There is a more definite limitation on both 101(6) and 162(a), but it
probably has little practical significance. If a founder should retain legal
control of his foundation over and above the normal control which he may
87. Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578 (1924). The Board
of Tax Appeals extended the Trinidad holding to its logical extreme in Sand Springs
Home, 6 B.T.A. 198 (1927) (old folks home operated a cotton gin, had oil and gas
leases, sold oil and gas, generated electricity, sold water to the public, and owned and
operated an amusement park; most of the home's income was ploughed back into busi-
ness each year; the home's income was held completely tax exempt). The Bureau of
Internal Revenue acquiesced in the decision, VI-1 CuM. BuLL. 5 (1927). Moreover, no
case has been found denying exemption under Section 101 (6) to a foundation engaged in
business. TuNxs 273-4.
As a result of these holdings, charities have gone into all sorts of business, often to
the advantage of private individuals or corporations with which they deal. See note 113
infra. Today charitable and educational organizations have a larger income from business
activity than any of the other 18 groups of tax-exempt organizations except cooperatives.
Fortune, Aug., 1947, p. 108, 140, col. 2.
As a partial remedy for this situation, Representative Mason has introduced a bill
in Congress to remove the tax exemption now extended by the Supreme Court interpre-
tation of Section 101(6) of the Internal Revenue Code to business income of all charitable
organizations. H.R. 5064, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). In defining "business income,"
the bill specifically excludes interest and dividend income received by charitable organi-
zations. For doubts as to the advisability of such a remedy, see note 165 infra.
88. See note 83 supra.
89. Similar stress has been placed upon the language of trust indentures in cases
arising under Section 162(a). E.g., Bank of America v. Commissioner, 26 F.2d 48, 51
(9th Cir. 1942). See Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, U. S. Senate, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 726-31 (1948) (testimony of
Claude R. Branch and Senator J. Howard McGrath).
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exercise as a trustee, the foundation's* incorhe will be taxed to the founder
as ordinary personal income." Founders rarely make this mistake, however.
In establishing charitable trusts they often appoint themselves sole trustees
and thereby retain all the control they need without jeopardizing any of
the trust's tax privileges. When they establish corporations, which are more
prevalent than trusts, founders usually retain effective control on an in-
formal basis." And informal control is no ground for denying the founda-
tion's tax deductions or exemptions.1
2
90. The income of such a foundation is taxed to the founder on the theory that lie
never parted with the income-producing wealth. Similarly, founders are not entitled to
income tax deductions for contributions to such foundations. If the founder still controls
the property, obviously he is unable to take a deduction for giving it away. Some of the
provisions denying tax privileges to foundations legally controlled by their founders are
legislative, INT. REv. CODE § 166, and some are administrative. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111,
§2922(a)-21 (1947). They were not passed to limit foundation tax privileges. Pri-
marily, they are designed to prevent wealthy taxpayers from splitting their income among
trusts which they control, and thereby decreasing the total tax payable on such income
through payment of lower surtaxes on each portion of the split income. To the extent
that founders retain the type of control specified in these provisions, they are affected in-
directly by the provisions.
The control specified in Section 166 of the Internal Revenue Code is retention by
the grantor or any person not having a substantial adverse interest in the trust of the
power of revocation. The following controls specified in Treasury Regulation 111,
§ 29.22 (a)-21 are pertinent to foundations: retention by the grantor or anyone not having
a substantial adverse interest in the trust of the power to buy charity assets in a prefer-
ential manner; to borrow from the trust without interest, security or a provision for
repayment within one year; other than as trustee, to vote stock held by the trust, control
trust investments, or substitute different investments for those held by the trust.
91. Of 55 foundation board members questioned several years ago, 30, including 10
who said so emphatically, believed in strict adherence to the vishes of the founder in ad-
ministration of the foundation; 11 were undecided; and 14 did not believe in such ad-
herence, 7 of them strongly. COFFIMAx, A .RTCucN FOUNDAviONS 166, 167, 169 (1936).
Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller exercised strong informal control over the
boards of their foundations. See CAnxBosu IqsTrIrT E OF WAsnINGToI, YEArMOOK Fo
1919 10-11 (Pres. Woodward's report: "Thus, to cite a single example, which illustrates
his characteristic frankness and fairness, shortly before the construction of the non-magnetic
ship was authorized . . . he . . . [remarked], 'I don't approve that project you are urg-
ing for a non-magnetic ship. But,' he added, 'maybe I don't understand it?' The oppor-
tunity thus gracefully extended was speedily utilized and Mr. Carnegie was readily con-
vinced that the project in question was not one merely of an enthusiastic dreamer, but
one based on the carefully verified . . . plans of competent engineers."); RocnmEat.w
FOUNDATION, ANqNUAL REPORT FOR 1915, p. 333 ("at the suggestion of the donor," holdings
in the Colorado Industrial Company were traded for Virginia-Carolina Chemical hold-
ings) ; SEN. Doc. No. 415, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., v. 8 p. 7776 (1916) (testimony of John
D. Rockefeller, Jr.: "Our office staff is a sort of family affair. We talk over all kinds of
matters of our common interest. We have not drawn sharp lines betveen business and
philanthropic interests."). The stock voting histories of large foundations indicate that
they vote their stock with the interest of the founder's family. See BR.L AND MEfANS,
TnE M DERN CopoRAa',oN AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 82-3 (1932); TUNrS 115. See also
id. at 257-8; GRIsWoLD, CASES ON FEDERAL TAXATION 296 (1946); Note, The Use of
Charitable Foundations for Avoidance of Taxes, 34 VA. L. Rv. 18> 188-9 (1948).
92. The legislative and administrative provisions set out in note 90 supra are precise
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ABUSE AND MANIIULATION: THE TEXTRON STORY
By the exercise of effective informal control, founders often use foundation
tax benefits and assets to further their own business purposes. The activ-
ities of Royal Little, president of Textron, Inc., from 1944 to 1948, illustrate
the potentialities of this kind of manipulation." Involved in these activities
were the following charitable trusts controlled by Textron through Little:
the Rhode Island Charities Trust and the MIT Trust, formed by Little in
1937; 91 the Rayon Foundation Trust, formed in 1944 at Little's suggestion. 5
In 1944, Textron needed money to buy textile mills for its post-war ex-
pansion program." The Lonsdale Company, an old New England firm,
suited Textron's purposes: it had mills which Textron could use, and its
stock was selling at a price far below the potential value of its assets. If
Textron had had funds, and after buying control could have successfully
liquidated Lonsdale's excess working capital, it would have made enough
immediate profit to pay for the Lonsdale mills.07 But Textron, with its
credit already strained to the breaking point, could not raise funds to buy
the Lonsdale Company stock. s Moreover, Textron did not itself wish to
risk the Lonsdale purchase, even if funds were available. It could not bear
a loss, and it could ill afford to pay taxes on profits from the speculation,
since all profits would be needed to buy the Lonsdale mills."9
Little, as trustee for the Rhode Island Charities Trust, therefore pur-
chased almost all of Lonsdale's outstanding stock for $6,961,915,100 The
and delineated. Retention of a type of control not enumerated in those provisions will
therefore bring about no tax penalties.
93. These activities received wide public attention. They were investigated by a
subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce from Sep-
tember 22 to December 8, 1948, Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, U.S. Senate, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), and were pub-
licized by that committee in a report submitted on March 9, 1949, SEN. REP. No. 101,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), and in Press Release of Senator Charles W. Tobey, March
25, 1949. Little's activities received further publicity in the press. See, e.g., Fiester,
Taxes, Dynasties, and Charity, 168 NATION 414 (1949); Hepner, Naslaua Story, Har-
per's, Feb., 1949, p. 74; Fortune, May, 1947, p. 133; Id., Aug., 1947, p. 108; Business
Week, Mar. 5, 1949, p. 82.
94. SEN. REP. No. 101, supra note 93, at 8, 9; Hearings, supra note 93, at 201-2
(testimony of Royal Little).
95. SEN. REP. No. 101, supra note 93, at 8.
96. SEN. REP. No. 101, supra note 93, at 17; Hearings, supra note 93, at 215 (testi-
mony of Royal Little) ; Fortune, May, 1947, p. 133 at 134.
97. See SEN. REP. No. 101, supra note 93, at 17; Fortune, May, 1949, p. 133 at 135.
98. SEN. REP. No. 101, supra note 93, at 17; Fortune, May, 1947, p. 133 at 135-6.
99. See SEN. REP. No. 101, supra note 93, at 22; Hearings, supra note 93, at 302-3
(testimony of Royal Little), 345 (statement of Sen. Tobey, subcommittee chairman).
100. Hearings, supra note 93, at 279 (testimony of Benjamin R. Sturges, trustee of
R' I. Charities Trust), 882 (R. I. Charities Trust income tax return for 1945, Sched. E,
Ex. II). See also SEN. RE,. No. 101, supra note 93, at 17; Hearings, supra note 93, at 77
(document submitted by Emil Rieve, gen. pres., TWUA (CIO)).
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trust borrowed funds to make the purchase,""' and conversion of Lonsdale's
assets into liquid capital for distribution to the trust was necessary to enable
the trust to repay this debt. Little, as new controlling stockholder of Lons-
dale, therefore had Lonsdale sell two of its mills to the Rayon Foundation
for approximately $1,200,000.12 Out of the proceeds of this sale, and out
of Lonsdale's working capital and profits, Little had Lonsdale declare a
$4,529,790 dividend on December 15, 1944.101 Almost all of this dividend
went to the Rhode Island Charities Trust; and a sizable portion of the
dividend represented profits on sales of Lonsdale's current and fixed assets.'
Additional dividends during 1945 increased the trust's return on its Lons-
dale investment to $5,820,890.105 Finally, on October 31, 1945, the trust
sold its Lonsdale stock to Textron for $1,654, 3 10,13 thereby accomplishing
Little's original purpose of assimilating the Lonsdale Company into Tex-
tron's corporate structure. And the price was extremely low: Lonsdale had
an earning capacity of almost $2,000,000 a year at the time of the sale.' t
Nonetheless, the sale increased the trust's total return on its investment to
$7,475,200,108 for a net profit of $513,285 on the Lonsdale transaction.""
This profit was not taxed," 0 and it would have been many times greater
had the trust sold the stock to Textron at its true value.
While these stock transactions were taking place, the mills which Lons-
dale had sold in 1944 to the Rayon Foundation were leased back to Lonsdale
at a high rental."' The purpose of the original sale was to convert Lons-
dale's assets into liquid capital for distribution to the Rhode Island Charities
101. SEN. REP. No. 101, supra note 93, at 17; Hearings, supra note 93, at 282 (testi-
mony of Godfrey B. Simonds, trustee of R. I. Charities Trust), 943 (account statement
of R. I. Charities Trust, Dec. 4, 1944) ; Fortune, May, 1947, p. 133 at 136.
102. Hearings, supra note 93, at 504 (testimony of Bayard Ewing, trustee, Rayon
Foundation) ; SEx. REP. No. 101, supra note 93, at 17; Hearings, supra note 93, at 77
(document submitted by Emil Rieve, gen. pres., TWUA (CIO)), 907-8 (account state-
meat, Rayon Foundation Trust, Dec. 27, 1944, Jan. 20, 1945).
103. Hearings, supra note 93, at 832 (R. I. Charities Trust, income tax return for
1945, Sched. E, F-x. II), 281 (testimony of Benjamin R. Sturges, trustee, I L Charities
Trust) ; Sax. REEs. No. 101, supra note 93, at 17.
104. See Hearings, supra note 93, at 883 (R. I. Charities Trust, income tax return,
1945, Sched. E, E-mII).
105. Hearings, supra note 93, at 882 (R. I. Charities Trust, income tax return for
1945, Sched. E, Fx. II), 281 (testimony of Benjamin . Sturges, trustee, R. I. Charities
Trust).
106. Hearings, supra note 93, at 882 (R. I. Charities Trust, income tax return for
1945, Sched. E, Ex-. II) ; Sax. REP. No. 101, supra note 93, at 17.
107. In 1946, Lonsdale earned $1,900,000, and in 1947, $1,500,000. Sax. Rsa'. No. 101,
supra note 93, at 18; see also Fortune May, 1947, p. 133 at 136.
108. Hearings, supra note 93, at 882 (R. I. Charities Trus4 income tax return for
1945, Sched. E, Ex. II).
109. Ibid.
110. See note 123 infra.
111. SEN. REP. No. 101, supra note 93, at 17; Hearings, supra note 93, at 533-9
(testimony of Bayard Ewing, trustee, Rayon Foundation).
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Trust. The lease-back was necessary to enable Lonsdale to continue op-
erating the mills. And the high rental enabled Little to transfer liquid
capital from Lonsdale to the Rayon Foundation at a substantial tax-saving:
the rents were not taxed to the foundation 112 and, at the same time, were
deductible by Lonsdale from its gross income as expenses." 3 In less than
two years, the Rayon Foundation received more than $800,000 in rent from
Lonsdale.1 4 And this money was still available to Textron for investment
purposes, since Textron, through Little, controlled the Rayon Foundation's
investment policies.' 5
Finally on October 1, 1946, a year after Textron had bought the Lonsdale
stock from the Rhode Island Charities Trust, Little decided to cut the
rental payments on the Lonsdale mills. He therefore had the Rayon Foun.
dation sell the mills to the Sixty Trust, a non-charitable trust for the ben-
efit of Textron executives, for only $865,000." 6 The Sixty Trust then leased
the mills to Textron for a flatrental of only $102,000 a year. 117 Thus Textron
112. See note 123 infra.
113. The sale and lease-back device is used widely by large businesses to effect tax-
savings in corporate financing. The following is one of many patterns by which such
tax-savings can be accomplished:
Instead of floating long term loans, corporations in need of capital now sell their
land to universities or other charities. The land is then leased under a lease which is
either perpetual at the corporation's option or gives the corporation the right to repur-
chase at a nominal price. The "rental," after a number of years, will repay the charity its
principal and provide the charity with a desirable return on its investment. Meanwhile,
the corporation deducts the total "rental" payments from its annual gross income for
income tax purposes, whereas, if it merely borrows the money and repays it over an
equal number of years at the same rate of return, it can deduct only the interest pay-
ments from its annual gross income. The same tax result could be obtained through
orthodox financing if land could be retained and depreciated by the corporation for in-
come tax purposes. But since land is not depreciable property, U.S. Treas. Reg. 111,
29.23 (1)-2 .(1943), the sale and lease-back of land is the most favorable tax device
available. See, generally, Cary, Corporate Financing Through the Sale and Lease-Back
of Property: Business, Tax and Policy Considerations, 62 HARv. L. RIv. 1 (1948).
Charities are usually the collaborators with corporations in the use of the sale and
lease-back device. Private investors would balk at a perpetual lease-back to the corpo-
ration or an agreement giving the corporation the right to repurchase the land at a
nominal price. But charities are interested primarily in a steady and desirable return
on their capital rather than investment in real estate for profit purposes. In the Textron
type situation, however, the tax advantage in using charities controlled by their founder
is greater. High "rentals" can be paid, exceeding the charity's principal investment plus
a fair return, see notes 111 supra and 114 infra; tax exemptions can be claimed by the
corporation for these "rentals"; and the money thus paid to the charities remains avail-
able to the corporation for further investment purposes. See note 129 infra.
114. SEN. Rm,. No. 101, supra note 93, at 19.
115. See SEN. REP. No. 10f, supra note 93, at 22; Hearings, supra note 93, at 414
(testimony of Bayard Ewing, trustee, Rayon Foundation).
116. SEN. REP. No. 101, supra note 93, at 19.
117. Ibid. The change of letsor from the Rayon Foundation to the Sixty Trust was
made probably under the assumption that an outright sale of the mills by the foundation
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retained continuous use of the Lonsdale mills at prices controlled by Textron,
through Little, at all times.
The trusts, meanwhile, gained on the transactions: the Rhode Island
Charities Trust received large dividends from Lonsdale out of operating
profits and gains from sales of assets; and the Rayon Foundation received
high rentals on its lease back to Lonsdale of the mills which it had purchased.
Through transactions of this kind, the three principal trusts accumulated
all of their assets. By October, 1948 the Rayon Foundation had accumulated
approximately $750,000;11 th Rhode Island Charities Trust, $4,500,000; "1
and the MIT Trust, $1,000,000.Y2
From 1944 through 1947, these trusts all claimed deductions of their
entire gross incomes under Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code; "I!
and though the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has questioned the
propriety of those deductions, 22 the trusts have never paid any income
taxes. 123 Yet they have spent almost nothing on their beneficiaries.12  By
October, 1948 the Rhode Island Charities Trust had contributed $85,000
to the Providence Community Chest; 125 the Rayon Foundation had con-
tributed $75,000 to the Rhode Island School of Design; ' and the MIT
would be easier to explain than a drastic reduction in the rentals. See SEre. RE'. No.
101, supra note 93, at 18-19. And the change in lessee from Lonsdale to Textron was
probably also designed to remove suspicion from the transaction.
118. SENx. REP. No. 101, supra note 93, at 8.
119. Ibid.
120. Id. at 9.
121. See, for example, the tax returns of the Rhode Island Charities Trust and the
Rayon Foundation Trust for these years. Hearings, sitpra note 93, at 822-52, 870-33.
122. See, for example, the letter from George J. Schoeneman, Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue, written on September 5, 1947, informing Bayard Ewing, trustee of the
Rayon Foundation, that the foundation was not entitled to tax exemption under Section
101(6) since it was not "organized and operated exclusively" for charitable purposes. In
concluding, the letter stated, "Furthermore, there is no other provision of law under
which the trust may be held to be exempt." Hearings, supra note 93, at 506-7. Similar
letters were sent to J. Howard McGrath, one of the trustees of the Rhode Island Chari-
ties Trust, on September 8, 1947, id. at 577-8, and to Andrew N. Winslow, Jr., trustee of
the MIT Trust, on September 5, 1947, id. at 594. See also SE?;. REP. No. 101, supra
note 93 at 24-6.
123. SEN. REP. No. 101, supra note 93, at 8, 9.
124. Since the trusts argue that their funds were "permanently set aside" for chad-
table purposes, see Hearings, supra note 93, at 712-33 (testimony of Claude M. Branch,
attorney for the Rayon Foundation and MIT trusts), such failure to make contributions
may not be sufficient in court to nullify the deductions claimed under Section 162(a).
See note 89 supra. But trust income earned after 1947 can still be taxed to the founders
under Treasury Regulation 111, §29.22(a)-2 (1947), since the founder retained the
right to borrow from the trusts without security. See notes 132 infra and 90 mspra. And
there is sufficient judicial precedent to enable the taxing of trust income earned before
1947. E.g., Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
125. SEx. REP. No. 101, supra note 93, at 8.
126. Id. at 9.
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Trust had contributed nothing to the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy. 22
The trusts could not make regular contributions because their funds were
used primarily to finance Textron's further expansion in 1946. That year
Textron organized Textron Southern, Inc. to purchase the Gossett mills
in North and South Carolina for $12,000,000; 123 and the three trusts
bought three-fourths of a $4,000,000 class A stock issue of Textron South-
ern. 12 '9 The stock bore a 10% dividend rate and a call price double the issue
price."0 Yet, in 1947 and 1948, the trusts exchanged most of their class A
stock for Textron stocks and bonds worth less than the call price and paying
dividends of 5% and interest of 4y2% respectively."' 1 Thus the trusts were
willing suppliers of Textron's risk capital, and were equally willing to take
potential losses on their Textron investments for the benefit of Textron.
Although the trustees were absolved in their trust inddntures of all
pecuniary liability for their actions,3 2 equity might have compelled them
to contribute more than they did to their beneficiaries.' And in spite of
broad powers granted to the trustees in the trust indentures, 3 4 equity
might well have found abuse of discretion, sufficient to warrant injunctions,
in the sale by the Rhode Island Charities Trust of its Lonsdale stock to
Textron; the sale by the Rayon Foundation of its Lonsdale mills to the
Sixty Trust; and the exchanges of Textron Southern class A stock by all
three trusts for less desirable Textron stocks and bonds.' 35
But none of the trustees' actions were ever challenged in court. This is
typical of the widespread nonenforcement of the terms of charitable founda-
tions throughout the country."' The small foundation, by facilitating the
127. SEN. REP. No. 101, supra note 93, at 9.
128. Fortune, May, 1947, p. 133 at 152; see Hearings, supra note 93, at 218-19 (state-
ment by Royal Little).
129. The Rayon Foundation and the MIT Trust each purchased 50,000 shares for
$500,000, and the Rhode Island Charities Trust purchased 200,00 shares out of a
400,000 share issue with a par value of $4,000,000. SEN. REP. No. 101, supra note 93, at
13. See also Hearings, mipra note 93, at 906 (account statement, Rhode Island Charities
Trust, May 1, 1946), 910 (account statement, Rayon Foundation, May 1, 1946), and 917
(account statement, MIT Trust, May 1, 1946).
130. SEN. RE'. No. 101, supra note 93, at 13; Fortune, May, 1947, p. 133 at 155.
131. SEN. REP. No. 101, supra note 93, at 13-16.
132. The texts of the trust indentures are set out in Hearings, vtpra note 93, at 318-22
(Rayon Foundation indenture), 508-12 (MIT Trust), and 512-22 (Rhode Island Chari-
ties Trust). The indentures relieved the trustees from liability for losses resulting fron
investment in non-listed and unproductive securities; purchase of securities on margin;
short sales of securities; promoting the organization and expansion of business enter-
prises; underwriting securities; and engaging in "speculative" or "venturesome" trans-
actions. SEN. REP. No. 101, sutra note 93, at 11-12. The trustees were also empowered
to borrow from their trusts without security. E.g., Hearings, sispra note 93, at 319
(Rayon Foundation indenture, 5(f). See note 124 supra.
133. See note 50 supra.
134. See note 132 supra.
135. See note 51 supra.
136. See notes 53-S supra.
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rapid accumulation of tax-free "charitable" funds, has become a favorite
device for tax avoidance, for retention of control over those funds, and for
manipulation of the funds for private purposes.ln And while these de-
velopments preclude faithful performance by trustees or directors of their
charitable duties, and have led in recent years to growing abuses by such
fiduciaries,3 s little effort has been made to improve the enforcement of
provisions establishing charitable foundations.I,
But the Textron story reveals a need for more than enforcement of existing
controls. Certain of the more obviously disadvantageous transfers from the
trusts to Textron violated existing rules. But no present law prevented
Textron from using its "charitable" trusts to help finance its own expansion
program 14 0 This was not the purpose for which charitable institutions were
granted a preferred tax status.
TowARD A CONCENTRATION OF WEALTH AND POWER
While the Textron trusts, which are not perpetuities,"' were designed for
137. "But many of the newer funds do not recognize even a minimum of social re-
sponsibility. Two or three hundred of the so-called foundations, including some of the
biggest, are simply family trusts: receptacles into which men put funds which thereupon
become free of taxes. Their boards of trustees are often simply the founder, one or two
members of his family, and his attorney ... But there is a strong suspicion that in
given instances the 'trustees' have used these funds to bolster up a family business. The
founder continues, in fact if not in law, to control the funds of many of these trusts and
can invest them in any way that suits his whim or his business interest." Embree
Timid Billions: Are the Foundations Doing Their Jobf, Harper's, Iarch, 1949, p. 26 at 33.
See also HAmso.v AeN Ainanws 74; Note, The Use of Charitable Foundations for
Avoidance of Taxation, 34 VA. L. REv. 182, 188-9; Fortune, Aug., 1947, p. 103 at 169,
col. 2.
138. Abuses in addition to those manifested in the Textron story are: dormancy of
foundations through failure to apply the doctrine of cy pres, see notes 52 and 58 mspra;
Fortune, Aug., 1947, p. 108 at 143; payment of excessive fees to trustees or directors (this
was present to a minor extent in the Textron story, see Sux. REP. No. 101, supra note
93, at 8); Bushnell, Report and Recommendatiom for Legislation, Mfass. L. Q., fay,
1945, pp. 22, 30, 32; inefficient foundation administration, id. at 31; reversion of founda-
tion property to donors because of non-compliance with conditions of the grant; and foun-
dation inactivity because of failure to appoint trustees. CIO wio TWVUA, STATEUEINT
BEFoaR R.I. SPEc. Comm. ox CHABnrrALE Tausrs 5-12 (1949); Note, 47 Cor. L. REv.
659, 662 (1947).
139. Only New Hampshire has supplemented the attorney-general's enforcement
power, see notes 54-6 supra, with legislation providing for maintenance by the attorney-
general of a register of charitable trusts. N.H. Rnv. LAWS c. 24 §§ 13-a to 13-n, cited
in CIO AnD TWUA, STATEmENT BeroR RI. Spec. Commx. ozz CHA=Axmn TnusMs ap-
pendix, Ex. IV (1949). The legislation is inadequate, however, since it does not apply
to charitable corporations, or inter vivos trusts during the lives of their settlors. rd.,
§ 13-b. Legislation establishing a Division of Public Charities, which was to be applicable
to all foundations, was proposed in Massachusetts in 1945 by Attorney-General Bushnell
but was not adopted. CIO AND TWUA, STATEmENT BEFo R.I. SPec. CoUnr. o. CRAM-
TABLE Tnusrs appendix, M. V (1949).
140. SEx. R .No. 101, supra note 93, at 8.
141. The Rayon Foundation vill terminate 20 years after the deaths of its settlor,
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use only as short-term business weapons, foundations have been employed
by their creators to serve long-term economic purposes as well. One such
purpose is the continued growth and perpetual preservation of an industrial
empire. The Duke Endowment, for example, established in 1924 by James
B. Duke, owns more than half the outstanding stock of the Duke Power
Company and receives almost all of its income from that source.142 The foun-
dation distributes most of its income among universities, colleges, hospitals
and churches in the Carolinas.'4 These groups have occasionally dem-
onstrated their gratitude by vocal support of the Duke power monopoly."'
Moreover, the foundation is forever available as a source of capital for the
power company. It may not sell any of its Duke Power securities with-
out the unanimous consent of its trustees; 146 and, since the Duke family
has continuing representation on the board of trustees,' such a unanimous
vote is improbable. Furthermore, future foundation investments may be
made only in Duke Power securities or domestic government bonds. 47
Edward Winsor, and inother, when all of its property will vest in the Rhode Island
School of Design. Hearijngs, supra note 93, at 319 (Rayon Foundation indenture). The
MIT Trust will terminate 20 years after the death of Royal Little when all of its
property will vest in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Id. at 511 (MIT Trust
indenture). And the assets of the Rhode Island Charities Foundation will go to the
Rhode Island Foundation after Royal Little's death. Id. at 520 (R.I. Charities Trust in-
denture).
142. See TuNKs. 148-50.
143. See TuNis 149-50.
144. During the New Deal, for example, a Public Works Administration loan to
Greenwood County, South Carolina for a power plant was opposed successfully on the
ground that the benefactions of the Duke Foundation would be reduced by construction of
a competing power plant. Flexner, Private Fortunes and the Public Future, 156 Am.
MONrTLY 215, 221 (1935). See also Note, The Use of Charitable Foundations for
Avoidance of Taxes, 34 VA. L. Rav. 182, 192 (1948); Graves, Benevolent Water Powcr,




The Duke Endowment presents an outstanding example of private pressure at work.
Charles W. Seeman, an ex-Director of the Press of Duke University has made the fol-
lowing charges:
(1) A trustee of the Duke Endowment who was also president of the American
Cyanamid Company, in which a trust allied with the Endowment, the Angler B. Duke
Memorial, held stock, suppressed a Duke publication as having been issued by "mistake"
which failed adequately to credit the Cyanamid product for beetle control.
(2) The results of tobacco research at Duke University, supported largely by the
Duke Endowment, go to Liggett and Meyers, in which the Endowment as well as the
Doris Duke Trust (the Duke family's private trust), holds stock.
(3) The results of serum development at Duke University go to Lederle Labora-
tories, a wholly owned subsidiary of American Cyanamid.
(4) The Duke Law School periodical, LAw AND CONTamroRaRy Pnotxms, was
subjected to censorship for having commented too favorably on New Deal legislation.
(5) The Endowment forced the resignation of the law school dean, Justin W. Miller.
I Seeman, Duke But Not Doris, 88 NEW REPUBLIC 220 (1936),; Seeman, In Re-
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The Ford family has provided the most striking modern example of how
private individuals may use a charitable foundation as an instrument for
the perpetual concentration of economic power. Payment of estate and gift
taxes on transfers by the late Henry and Edsel Ford to Henry II would
have necessitated sale of a substantial portion of the Ford stock and a
consequent reduction of the Ford family's holding in the company.143 Both
individuals avoided these taxes by donating almost all their stock in the
Ford Motor Company to the Ford Foundation.1"0 The foundation, es-
tablished as a perpetuity in 1936 for "scientific, educational, and charitable
purposes," Is' owns Ford non-voting stock valued, as of December 31, 1947,
at $204,855,975 a51 --almost 90% of the total equity in the Ford Motor
Company. 5 2 Henry Ford II controls the foundation, 1' 3 and foundation
contributions to charity during 1947 were under $1,000,000-less than .05%
of total foundation assets.5 4 The institution has served primarily as a
buttal, 89 NEw REPuBLc 48 (1936). Some of these charges were denied by Professor
David F. Cavers, editor of LAW AND CONTrzE'PORARY PROBLmus, and Messrs. Fuller
and Maggs of the Duke Law School faculty. Cavers, Fuller and Maggs, The Duke
University Law School In Rebuttal, 88 Naw REPU .Lc 311 (1936); Cavers, More About
Duke, 89 Nmv REPuBLic 114 (1936).
Another example is presented by the Milbank Memorial Fund. For a while the Fund
financed, in part, the researches of a Committee on the Costs of Medical Care. The
Fund, at that time, was experimenting in the direction of group medicine. The Ameri-
can Medical Association came into sharp contact with the Committee. Albert Milbank
was president of the Fund and related to the founder, Elizabeth Milbank Anderson; he
was also interested in the Borden Company. And when the A.M.A. threatened to boy-
cott the Borden Company, the Fund withdrew its support of the group medicine re-
searches conducted by the Committee on the Costs of Group Medical Care. Coon,
Moxay To Buax 236-40 (1938).
148. The elder Fords did not have enough liquid assets to provide for payment of
gift or estate taxes on transfers of their Ford stock. See Business Week, Nov. 13,
1948, p. 24.
149. Newsweek, May 5, 1947, p. 70; N.Y. Times, April 19, 1947, p. 1, col. 4; id. at
p. 21, col. 2.
150. Fortune, Aug., 1947, p. 108, col. 2; N.Y. Times, April 20, 1947, § 4, p. 8, col. 2.
151. RxcH AN DF-A0RnoaF 58.
152. Of a total Ford Motor Company equity of 172,645 shares of class B, voting
stock and 3,280,255 shares of class A, non-voting stock, the foundation owns 3,03-,949
shares of class A stock, 1,804,140 of which it received from Henry Ford I, and 1,278,809
from Edsel Ford. Newsweek, May 5, 1947, p. 70 at 71.
153. See RicH AND DFAooRFF 58; N.Y. Times, April 22, 1947, p. 29, col. 8.
154. The foundation contributed $982,185.67 to its beneficiaries during 1947. Ricu
AN DEApRoarr 58. The dividends received by the foundation on its Ford Motor Co.
stock have not been disclosed by the foundation or the corporation. But the annual re-
port for 1947 filed by the corporation with the Massachusetts State Tax Commission
showed an increase in surplus of $48,857,004 on December 31, 1947 over the comparable
1946 figure. Business Week, Sept. 25, 1948, p. 99. This figure, which represents the
annual increase in surplus after dividend declarations, indicates that if the foundation,
which owns almost 90% of the corporation's Class A stock, see notes 151 and 152 smpra, did
not receive a dividend for 1947 substantially in excess of $1,000,000, it should have. And
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medium for transferring control and preserving an accumulation of wealth
against tax erosion.
While preservation or growth of dynastic control over finance or industry
seldom appears so clearly as the founder's primary motivation,1" such
accomplishments are a common result. Surplus wealth is donated, tax-free,
to a foundation; such wealth is often embodied in securities of an enter-
prise which the donor controls; through the foundation, the donor continues
to control the enterprise; 116 and since most foundations are perpetual," 7
control remains in the founder's family indefinitely.
An analysis of the stock holdings of the 200 largest non-financial corpora-
tions in the United States holding about 25% of the assets of all corporations
as of 1937, revealed the following:
In 64 of the 200 corporations, foundations were among the 20 largest
holders of one or more issues of voting stock.1 18 About 40 of the corporations
were controlled by small family or business groups; "I and perpetual foun-
dations played a complementary role in 11 of these instances."1 Two family
only the influence of Henry II, who also controls the foundation, see note 153 ..upra,
could have prevented the declaration of such a dividend.
155. See pp. 497-500 and notes 142-54 supra. After establishing the Duke Endow-
ment, James B. Duke is reported to have said that he "had 'em fixed." Seeman, Duke
But Not Doris, 88 NEw REPuBLIc 220 (1936). See also TuNtos 148, 153,
156. See note 91 supra.
157. See notes 66 and 67 supra.
158. See THE DISTRIBuTIoN OF OWNERSHIP IN THE 200 LARGEST NON-FINANCIAL
CORPORATIONS Appendix X (TNEC Monograph 29, 1940) ; Tuxxs 116.
159. See THE DIsTmuUON or OWNmSHIP IN THE 200 LARGEST Non-FINANCIAL
CORPORATIONS 105-9 (TNEC Monograph 29, 1940) ; TuNxs 129.
160. Four of the corporations were controlled by small groups through majority
ownership of controlling voting stock in the following manner: Percentage Con-
trolled by Family,
Family in Percentage Owned Including Foun-
Corporation Control by Foundation dation Holdings
Gulf Oil Corp. Mellon 5% 69%
S. H. Kress & Co. Kress 6 85
Duke Power Co. Duke 38 82
Anderson-Clayton Anderson and 47 94
Clayton
Seven of the corporations were controlled through ownership of a substantial mi-
nority of controlling voting stock in the following manner: Percentage Con-
trolled by Family,
Family in Percentage Owned Includinq Foon-
Corporation Control by Foundation dation Holdings
S.S. Kresge Co. Kresge 22% 44%
Ohio Oil Co. Rockefeller 9 (3 founda- 18tions)
Pullman Inc. Mellon 2 10
Sears, Roebuck & Co. Rosenwald 1 12
Standard Oil Co. of California Rockefeller .5 12.5
Standard Oil Co. of Indiana Rockefeller 4.5 11.4
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey Rockefeller 4.8 13.5
THE DISTRIBUTION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE 200 LARGEST NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
105-9, 122-9, 131 Appendix X (TNEC Monograph 29, 1940); see also Tunxs 129-31,
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groups are outstanding: the Rockefeller group, controlling an estimated
3 per cent of all non-financial corporations, and 6Y per cent of the 200 lead-
ing non-financial corporations, had one-third of its equity owned by various
Rockefeller foundations; 16 and the Mellon group, controlling an estimated
1 per cent of all non-financial corporations, and 2Y2 per cent of the 200
leading non-financial corporations, had one-sixth of its equity owned by the
A. W. Mellon Educational and Charitable Trust.
0 2
While charity may benefit from contributions of all or part of these
foundations' income, the benefits are likely to be small compared with those
reaped by a founder and his family.0 3 Of course the latter cannot make
personal use of the funds.6 4 But they can secure high positions, high sal-
aries and inside opportunities from the companies they continue to control.
Moreover, foundations are usually endowed with funds from estate or in-
come which the founder and his descendants do not need for spending pur-
poses anyway. Foundations are thus a painless method for maintaining
and augmenting economic power. By not revising the tax-exemption pro-
visions, the federal government has let a small hole in the tax policy against
concentrated wealth turn into a gaping breach.
PROPOSALS FOR PEFORMi
Given the purpose behind our tax exemption policy, the only proper
function of a charitable foundation is to make the largest possible char-
itable contributions. The modern privately controlled foundation, whether
perpetual or non-perpetual, is not fulfilling this function as well as it should.
A short reason for this inadequate performance is that charitable purposes
and private business purposes do not always mix.
The principal concern here is not whether it is good or bad, in and of
itself, for foundations to operate commercial or industrial enterprises. In
these days of low interest rates, business activities may yield much greater
annual income than investment in stocks and bonds-as more and more
universities are beginning to discover. A public policy which shut off these
legitimate efforts to gain more income would be self-defeating.' 0
161. THE Disrmunox OF OwNERs~rr n THE 200 LARGEST NoN-Fn;Azcr .L Con-
PORA iONS 126-9 (TNEC Monograph 29, 1940); see TuNKs 131.
162. THE DisnnBunioN OF OWNERSHIP IN THE 200 LARGEST NoNT-FizrNAcAL Con-
PORATiONS 122-6 (TNEC Monograph 29, 1940); see Tusxs 131.
163. Five hundred and five foundations reported grants of $52,404,554 during 1945,
HAIuusoN AND ANDREWS 59; 186 reported grants of $56,779,000 during 1947, rMcH AND
DEARDORFF 11; and the latest unofficial estimate of annual foundation contributions, made
by the Sloan Foundation, is $100,000,000. N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1949, p. 21, col. 1.
164. Once assets or income are spent on private individuals, the foundation, if it is a
trust, may not exist perpetually. See notes 61, 63-65 .nepra. And no foundation may retain
tax privileges once its assets or income are spent on private individuals. INr. Rcv. CoD%
§23(o), 23(q), 101(6), 162(a), 812(d), 1004(a) (2) (B).
165. The policy would be self-defeating insofar as favored treatment of educational
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The important issue is whether a foundation should be permitted freely
to invest in, control or operate a business in which the founder and his heirs
have a private interest, or to assist those personages in augmenting their
resources. Often such investment will not be the most profitable available
to the foundation. But even if it is, the policy against undue concentration
of private wealth is circumvented.
This problem is potentially most severe in the case of the perpetual
foundation, since perpetuity is more or less essential to large-scale operation
of business enterprises or long-term control of economic power. This would
be good reason for ending the perpetual foundation entirely unless it can be
divorced from private control.
There are additional arguments against the perpetual foundation, apart
from the problem of control. It is somewhat paradoxical to justify the
institution on the ground that it can engage in activities or investments
yielding a higher income for charity. A much higher income to meet existing
needs would be achieved by spending principal; yet this by definition a
perpetual foundation cannot do. 8' Of course the institution may also be
defended as a device providing a sure source of funds for future needs."0 7
But future needs are uncertain indeed, and there is little reason to believe
that future generations will be unable to muster resources to solve their own
problems.'
Whether or not the perpetual foundation is to be eliminated, however, it
should be generally agreed (1) that no foundation should become an instru-
and charitable institutions is concerned.
It can be argued that the favoritism should not be pushed to the point that competi-
tive relationships in a particular industry are upset. Assume, for example, that the en-
tire stock of Corporation A, a shoe-manufacturing concern, is owned by Corporation B,
a university. As long as Corporation B is exempted solely from a tax on dividends, and
Corporation A has to pay the usual corporate income tax, Corporation A has no com-
petitive advantage, tax-wise, which it can use to cut price and expand its business, But
if Corporation B's immunity is extended through to Corporation A, the latter can cut
its price and still pay the same dividends-or perhaps greater dividends in the long-run
through expansion of its business.
Theoretically the argument is unsound: since the corporate profits tax is deducted
"after the fact," it should have no effect on the "best price" for a corporation to charge--
if the corporation was maximizing its revenue in the first place, it would not change its
price after removal of the tax. But businessmen do not always follow the dictates of
economic -theory, particularly under changing market conditions, and it is conceivable
that elimination of a corporate profits tax would stir a corporation into aggressive ex-
pansionary activity.
However, it is quite doubtful that universities would be aggressive businessmen. It
would be bad public relations, and may actually reduce endowment contributions. For
example, a businessman would be loathe to make a donation to a university that was or
might become a competitor. See also note 87 supra.
166. See TuNxs 237.
167. HAmuuSON AND ANDRSWS 69-70; see TUNKS 237.
168. See Rosenwald, Principles of Public Giving, 143 ATL. MONTHLY 599, 606 (1929);
Tu.xs 237.
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ment for private control over wealth or enterprise, and (2) that the Textron
type of manipulation should not be permitted to recur.
While the states and Federal Government have done almost nothing along
these lines, they have received numerous suggestions. The most recent of
these proposals was stimulated by the Textron story. Shortly after a United
States Senate subcommittee reported on Textron's activities,' a Special
Committee on Charitable Trusts was organized in Rhode Island, home of the
Textron foundations, to recommend remedial legislation. The Textile
Workers' Union of America (CIO) proposed that the committee recommend
amendment of the laws of Rhode Island to require the following:
1. Distribution by all foundations of 85 per cent of their annual income
to charitable beneficiaries.
2. Divestment by all foundations of all holdings in excess of 10 per cent
of theinterest in a particular business enterprise.
3. Limitation of all foundation investments to a list approved by the
Commissioner of Banking.
4. Limitation of the lives of all foundations to 25 years.Y'
5. Establishment of a three man Board of Charitable Trusts to enforce
these regulations, and creation of a public registry of all foundations to
provide the board with all necessary information. 7 1
With the exception of the proposal for an active and well-staffed enforce-
ment agency, 172 these proposals are too arbitrary. A foundation may find
it legitimately inadvisable to spend 85 per cent of its income during a given
year. Limiting ownership to less than 10 per cent of a business enterprise
would prevent a foundation from operating a business even though that
business had no connection with the interests of the founder and his suc-
cessors. A 25 year limit on foundation existence would force liquidation of
a going administration organization which, having developed skill in the
distribution of charitable benefits, would be a logical recipient of new grants.
Finally, restriction of investments to a list approved by the Commissioner
of Banking would probably result in ultra-conservative foundation invest-
ments to the ultimate detriment of charitable income.
173
But the principal shortcoming of the union proposal is its confinement to
reform on the state level. State limitation of the lives of existing founda-
169. SEN. REP. No. 101, supra note 93.
170. CIO AN]) TWUA, STATEmENT BFaroP R.I. SpEC. Comm. ox CH A=.E TRusTs
3-4, 18-22 (1949).
171. Id. at 2-3, 15-18.
172. Even the commentators most favorable to foundations have consistently urged
such reform. See, e.g., HARRiSON A)D AxNomvs 74; Note, The Use of Charitable Foun-
dations for Avoidance of Taxation, 34 VA. L. REv. 182, 200-1 (1948) ; Hearings, supra
note 93, at 208 (testimony of Royal Little).
173. See, for example, the conservative securities approved for trust investments in
those states which have promulgated "approved" lists. Statutes cited note 47 supra. See
also 2 ScOTT, TRUSTS §227.13; TUNKS 198-9; Legis., 49 H~Av. L. REv. 821, 823 (1936).
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tions to 25 years would meet with constitutional objections, As applied to
perpetual trusts already in existence, and to corporations organized under
special charter, the proposal would probably be unconstitutional under
Article II, Section 10 of the Constitution as an impairment of the obligations
of the contracts establishing such foundations. 1 4 Lives of corporations es-
tablished under general enabling statutes could probably be limited, on
the other hand, since most enabling statutes reserve to the state the power
to modify corporate charters. 175
Moreover, even if there were no constitutional objections, there would
be practical difficulties. For state reform to be effective, it must be adopted
by all states. Otherwise founders will merely incorporate in states which
leave the foundations free. Finally, even if uniform laws were adopted$
there might be considerable discrepancies in the efficiency with which they
are enforced.
The most recent 176 official proposal for federal action has ignored almost
174. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (U.S. 1819) (state
legislature had no power to alter the charter of a charitable corporation which was held
to be a contract between the state and the corporation) ; Cary Library v. Bliss, 151 Mass.
364, 25 N.E. 92 (1890) (Dartmouth College holding extended to charitable trusts). See
3 ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 367.3, 399.5.
175. E.g., ILL STAT. AN. c. 32, § 163a99 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1948).
176. Two older proposals are significant:
(I) The Walsh Commission report of 1916, prepared by the Commission's director,
Basil M. Manly, and joined in by Senator Walsh and Messrs. Lennon, O'Connell and
Garretson, recommended the following after extensive hearings at which Louis Brandeis,
Samuel Untermeyer, Amos Pinchot, Henry Ford, the Rockefellers, and many others
testified:
A. Foundations should be required to obtain a federal charter if their funds exceed
$1,000,000 and their purposes encompass more than one function. The charter should
require:
1. A limit on total funds.
2. A definite statement of powers.
3. A prohibition upon accumulation of funds and upon spending more than 10% of
the principal fund in any one year.
4. Inspection of expenditures and investments by government authority.
5. Annual and complete reports to the government.
6. A prohibition of any activity not enumerated unless
(a) the trustees approve unanimously,
(b) Congress is advised of such proposed action, and
(c) no such action be undertaken until 6 months from such notification.
B. Increased government appropriations for educational and social service. Sm.
Doc. No. 415,64th Cong., 1st Sess., v. 1 pp. 85-6 (1916).
(II) A recommendation by Randolph Paul before the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee in 1942 is a simple and expedient one, and might ultimately prove effective if it Is
ever adopted. Mr. Paul suggested that the estate and gift tax deductions for gifts to
charities (see INT. Rnv. CoDE §§ 812(d) and 1004(a) (2) (B)) be limited to a fixed per-
centage of the estate in the same manner as income tax deductions for charitable gifts
are limited to 15% of individual gross income, id., § 23(o), and 57 of corporate gross
income, id., § 23(q). Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means on Rcvenue
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all the essential elements of adequate control. In February, 1949, a sub-
committee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
after investigation of Textron's operations, recommended the following:
"[Slection 162 of the Internal Revenue Code [should] be amended to provide
that no trust shall receive benefits under Section 162(a) . . . unless during
the taxable year it has actually paid to its beneficiary 85 per cent of its
gross income received in such taxable year." 177
Concededly, this amendment of 162(a) would prevent a recurrence of the
Textron story. Not having been qualified by the Bureau of Internal Rev-
enue for exemption under 101(6),18 the Textron trusts claimed, and appar-
ently were allowed, deductions of their entire incomes under 162(a) from
1944 through 1947.11- And since Textron used the trusts to accumulate
funds, tax exempt, for its ultimate benefit, a requirement that such trusts
either contribute 85 per cent of their income to charity or lose their tax
privileges under 162(a) would effectively block identical schemes in the future.
But the subcommittee proposal, in failing to recommend similar amend-
ment of 101(6), would leave unmolested most manipulation of foundation
assets for short-term business purposes. Most foundations are incorporated, 1'
and since 162(a) does not apply to corporations, the majority of founda-
tions claim tax exemption under 101(6). And the liberal interpretation
already given by courts to that section as applied to foundations actually
earning income from business operations 1s1 would assure the continued
tax-free accumulation of foundation assets.
But even with a similar amendment of 101(6), long-term preservation of
wealth or economic power through perpetual foundations would remain
unhampered. Restriction upon accumulation of income alone is incapable
of curtailing such practices, since successful preservation of wealth and
economic control depends primarily on preservation of principal rather than
accumulation of income. Yet the subcommittee suggested no restriction
upon foundation preservation of principal. Nor did it suggest any method of
liberating foundations from control by private interests-an alternative
way of insuring that foundations remain "charitable."
NEW PROPOSALS
Woefully inadequate as the Senate subcommittee's proposal may have
been, the group was quite correct in seeking stricter regulation of foundations
Rezision of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., v. 1 pp. 91-2 (1942). While this proposal does
not attack foundation evils directly, it might at least limit foundation assets sufficiently
to make them of little long-term use to their founders.
177. Smr. REP. No. 101, mtPra note 93, at 23-4; S. 1408, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
178. See letters to the trusts from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, cited epra
note 122.
179. See notes 121 and 123 mipra.
180. See note 31 supra.
181. See note 87 supra.
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under the federal taxing power. Some of the loopholes may be narrowed
by new Treasury regulations and more active Treasury enforcement under
the present Code. 82 But new tax provisions are necessary for adequate and
unambiguous elimination of private gain from charitable foundations.
The following recommendations are offered in the alternative. Recommen-
dation "A" is the more limited proposal. It assumes that private control and
manipulation can be effectively eliminated from all foundations, without
ending the perpetual foundation as such:
Recommendation "A"
"1. In order for a foundation to qualify for income tax exemption
under Section 101(6) or income tax deductions under Section 162(a)
of the Internal Revenue Code,
(a) no person shall at any time act in the capacity of trustee 18 if he
or any member of his family is a director of, or controls directly or
indirectly (1) a business in which the foundation has invested 10 per
cent or more of its assets or which the foundation directly or indirectly
controls, or (2) a business which deals, except in the ordinary course
of trade, with an enterprise in which the foundation has invested 10
per cent or more of its assets or which the foundation directly or in-
directly controls; and
(b) no corporation 184 shall act in the capacity of a trustee of a foun-
dation if such corporation is controlled directly or indirectly (1) by
182. The Treasury might try to define the word "charitable" more precisely than
courts have defined it in the past. A definition precluding founders from benefiting
privately from their foundations would be consistent with the purposes of the "charity"
sections of the Code. But the courts may hold a restrictive definition to be a substantive
change in the Code, or an administrative amendment of an unambiguous statute, and
therefore beyond the scope of the Treasury's regulating power. See notes 83, 87 and 89
supra. See, e.g., Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936) (receipt by preferred
shareholder of a common stock dividend, held income under the Code; and Treasury de-
clared powerless to tax such income as a capital gain under statute clearly providing for
taxation only of capital gains).
In view of the Treasury's past lethargy in attacking charitable tax privileges,
a regulation redefining "charity" might also be invalidated on the ground of novelty.
See pp. 489 and 490 and note 87 supra. See, e.g., Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245
(1926) (taxation of sale by stockholder, at more than "established price," of box tickets
acquired as part of investment in opera house company, held invalid, partly because the tax
on sales above "established price" was not previously so applied with consistency or
uniformity).
Finally, the setting apart of foundations from other institutions would be vulnerable to
attack. Such a distinction would be justifiable, since schools, hospitals and churches
have thus far remained relatively free of the disruptive pulls of private interest. But the
distinction is not made in the Code, and the Treasury might therefore be precluded from
making it.
183. "Trustee" means trustee, director or manager.
184. "Corporation" means corporation, partnership, individual proprietorship or any
other business association.
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a business in which the foundation has invested 10 per cent or more
of its assets or which the foundation directly or indirectly controls;
or (2) a person not eligible to act as trustee; nor shall a director of
such corporation act in the capacity of trustee.
"2. No estate tax deduction under Section 812(d), gift tax deduction
under Section 1004(a)(2)(B) or income tax deduction under Sections
23(o) and 23(q) of the Internal Revenue Code shall be allowed for a
contribution to a charitable foundation not meeting the requirements
of Section 1; provided tlux deductions shall be allowed to any person
or corporation which would be eligible to act in the capacity of trus-
tee." 185
Recommendation "B" is proposed as an alternative in case (1) itshould
be considered desirable to require the expenditure of principal of charitable
grants, and (2) it should be deemed unduly optimistic to assume that private
control over foundations can be eliminated.1 85 The proposal is designed to
sterilize private control rather than to end it:
Recomnidation "B"
"1. No estate tax deduction under Section 812(d), gift tax deduction
under Section 1004(a)(2)(B) or income tax deduction under Sections
23(o) and 23(q) of the Internal Revenue Code shall be allowed for a
contribution to a charitable foundation which
(a) does not plan in good faith to expend the principal and income of
its original grant and of any subsequent donations within 25 years
of the date on which the grant or donation was received; or
(b) does not plan in good faith to so diversify its investments that no
more than 10 per cent thereof is lodged in securities or assets of any
one business enterprise or group of enterprises controlled directly or
indirectly by persons who also control the foundation; provided that
a reasonable period, not to exceed 10 years after receipt of the original
or later donation, shall be given within which to accomplish any nec-
essary reduction;
(c) nor will any of said tax deductions be allowed for a contribution
by a person 117 to a foundation which he directly or indirectly con-
trols if the foundation's funds are used at any time to further acquire
assets or securities of a business enterprise related to that under his
direct or indirect control.
185. These provisions are comparable to those in other statutes which seek to regulate
"control." See, e.g., Trust Indenture Act of 1939, §310(b), 53 STAT. 1158-61 (1939),
15 U.S.C. §77jjj(b) (1946); Public Utility Holding Company Act, §2(a), 49 STAT.
804-810 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a) (1946) ; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(a),
48 STAT. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1946).
186. See note 91 supra.
187. "Person" means any individual, corporation or any other business association.
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"2. No foundation will be allowed income tax exemption under Sec-
tion 101(6) or income tax deductions under Section 162(a) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code, where such foundation
(a) [same as Section 1 (a)]; or
(b) [same as Section 1 (b)]; or
(c) uses its funds at any time during the year to further acquire assets
or securities of a business enterprise controlled directly or indirectly
by persons who also control the foundation, or to acquire assets or
securities of a business enterprise related to that under director in-
direct control of persons who also control the foundation."
Applied only to future founder deductions and foundation immunities,"'
both of these recommendations would be invulnerable to constitutional
attack. No foundation has an inherent right to retention of its tax priv-
ileges. Moreover, foundations affected by the proposed legislation would
not be forced to give up their privileges. Corporate directors could amend
their articles of incorporation,l" and trustees could apply to a court of equity
for reformation of their trust indentures "0 to comply with the proposed
requirements. The requirements of either recommendation could not be
challenged as an impairment of the obligations of contract when applied
to existing trusts and corporations: tax privileges existing at the time of
formation of a trust or corporation are not included among the "obligations
of contract" between the settlor and his trustee, or between the chartered
corporation and the government.'9 1
Adoption of the proposed legislation would place a heavy fact-finding
burden on the Bureau of Internal Revenue. To facilitate enforcement, all
foundations should be required to make full disclosure to the Treasury of
their business interests, charitable and business expenditures, and internal
administration. Most of this information, with the notable exception of
stock voting policy, is already supplied to the Treasury by organizations
188. Although Congress may tax income retroactively, at least for a period of less
than 12 months in the past, e.g., Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1915), there
are indications that a retroactive income tax for a longer period in the past would be
invalidated. See Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R., supra, at 20; Cohan v. Commissioner,
39 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1930). And retroactive application of gift taxes for only a few
months in the past has been held unconstitutional. Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S.
440 (1928); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142 (1927).
Effective future application of the requirements might require a longer statute of
limitations for the "charity" provisions of the Code. The present period, with some
minor exceptions, is three years. INT. REv. CODE § 275 (income tax), § 874 (estate tax)
and § 1016 (gift tax). Under a longer period, if a foundation were to violate these
provisions after five or ten years of compliance, the Treasury would still be able in
appropriate cases to tax the foundation's original grants.
189. See notes 42 and 52 .supra. To comply with Recommendation "A," charter amend-
ment is not necessary. Ineligible directors can simply resign.
190. See note 58 mipra.
191. E.g., Wisconsin and Michigan Ry. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379 (1903).
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claiming tax exemptions under Section 101(6) in their annual returns.9 2
But trusts claiming deductions under Section 162(a) are required to reveal
very little."93
It should hardly be necessary to add that Congress should appropriate
enough money for the Treasury to carry out its enforcement duties.
CONCLUSION
The modem philanthropic foundation, originally designed to perform only
a public function, has been tailored to serve private purposes as well. In its
philanthropic accomplishments, the foundation has often fallen short of its
tremendous potential. To prevent further deterioration, it has been pro-
posed that tax exemptions be withdrawn from those foundations which serve
two masters. Either of the recommendations advanced would go far toward
eliminating private gain from public charity and thereby maximizing the
benefits which the public actually derives.
These proposals may be subjected to the criticism that they would "dry
up the source of foundation contributions." 14 But such criticism is based
on the faulty assumption that practically all foundations are established
primarily for private rather than public good. This assumption seems amply
refuted by history."
But if indeed most foundations are created primarily for private purposes
and would therefore be wiped out by withdrawing the bribes of private
economic gain, benevolence need not be put to an end. Should resort to
foundations decline, additional tax revenues would accrue to the federal
and state governments. This money could then be used to fulfill in practice
the beneficent purposes which privately-controlled foundations have often
ignored.
192. This information is supplied in Form 990 and Form 1023, 1024 or 1026, pursuant
to Section 54(f) of the Internal Revenue Code. See TuNrs 282-3, 293-9.
193. These organizations file Form 1041 pursuant to Section 142 of the Internal
Revenue Code. See Tums 282-3, 298-9.
194. TUNKs 311.
195. See notes 16 and 18 mtpra.
